The Karnaphuli Tunnel opened amid huge aspirations as Bangladesh’s first under-river road tunnel, an engineering milestone promised to reshape travel and commerce in Chattogram. Around two years after inauguration the numbers tell a different story, with traffic levels far below the feasibility study’s estimates.

The National Pride and Big Expectations

The Karnaphuli Tunnel was promoted as a signal project for Bangladesh, a visible sign of modern infrastructure and a tool for economic transformation in Chattogram, the country’s biggest port city. Designed as a 3.32 kilometre under-river road tunnel with approach roads expanding the route to about 9.39 kilometres, the Karnaphuli Tunnel aimed to shorten travel times between the port area and the southern suburbs, reduce congestion across bridges, and unlock land on the southern bank for industry and housing.

The project was financed largely through a concessional loan from China’s Export-Import Bank, and executed by major international contractors, with the Bangladesh Bridge Authority as the implementing agency. The official opening took place in October 2023, accompanied by statements that the Karnaphuli Tunnel would eventually handle tens of thousands of vehicles per day.

Construction And Projection Details

The feasibility study envisioned an initial daily traffic of roughly 17,000 vehicles, with higher forecasts of about 28,305 vehicles by 2025 and close to 38,000 by 2030 under favourable development scenarios. The project cost ran into the multi-billion taka range, and the tunnel was built to modern standards with multiple safety and surveillance systems, CCTV monitoring, ventilation and pumping infrastructure. Planners explicitly tied the tunnel’s success to complementary investments, which were expected to stimulate industrial and residential growth on the Anwara side of the river, thereby feeding traffic into the Karnaphuli Tunnel.

Current Situation

Reality diverged starkly from projections, with the tunnel seeing on average between about 3,000 and 4,000 vehicles per day in its first year, a fraction of what the feasibility study predicted. Toll income data has been insufficient to cover operating and maintenance costs, and the authorities report daily operating deficits, meaning the state has been subsidising the Karnaphuli Tunnel to keep it functional. Media analyses and official toll reports show a worsening financial gap as the expected urban and industrial growth on the tunnel’s southern approaches have not materialised at projected pace.

Causes Behind Failing To Achieve Projection

One of the clearest and repeatedly cited reasons the Karnaphuli Tunnel did not meet traffic projections is a mismatch between the tunnel and the roads, zoning, and industrial links that were supposed to feed it. The feasibility forecasts assumed concurrent and rapid development of approach roads, interchanges, access routes and industrial parks on the Anwara side. In practice, many of those feeder projects lagged or were not delivered at expected scale, leaving the tunnel as an expensive stand alone corridor that did not connect smoothly into the city’s traffic patterns. Local engineers and planners warned during construction that the tunnel design did not sufficiently address traffic flow management at either portal, a flaw that has created bottlenecks and discouraged routine commuter use.

Overoptimistic Modelling And Flawed Assumptions

Feasibility studies for big transport projects often depend on optimistic assumptions, and the Karnaphuli Tunnel was no exception. The demand modelling assumed rapid industrialisation and population shifts that would produce strong traffic growth, but those socioeconomic changes are slower and more complex than single project forecasts allow. The original studies assumed that tolls would not deter users and that alternate routes were sufficiently congested to make motorists switch, however surveys and usage patterns show many drivers continued using existing bridges and roads to avoid tolls or additional distance. In short the modelling overestimated induced demand and underestimated user sensitivity to tolls and terminal access convenience.

Land Use And Economic Anchors Delayed

A central pillar of the project’s logic was that the Karnaphuli Tunnel would unlock significant industrial, warehousing and residential development on the southern bank, generating freight and commuter flows. That dynamic has been much slower than projected, due to land acquisition problems, slower private investment, and broader economic cycles. Without these anchors the tunnel lacks the natural demand generators that large infrastructure projects require, and it therefore functions more as an isolated engineering asset than as a catalyst for immediate modal shifts.

Comparison With Neighbouring Countries

Comparing the Karnaphuli Tunnel with similar projects in the region offers instructive contrasts. Singapore and Malaysia both built tolled tunnels and expressways that became successful when paired with coordinated land use policies, phased development of feeder roads, and pricing regimes calibrated to local behaviour. In some Indian cities tunnel or bridge projects also required complementary public transport links and freight management rules to reach projected use. The common thread is that engineering excellence alone does not guarantee traffic, projects need aligned urban planning and staged commercial development to produce the user base that feasibility studies assume. Where neighbouring projects succeeded, authorities actively managed access pricing, provided concessional permits to freight operators, or staged toll discounts to build habitual use. These are approaches that were less visible in the Karnaphuli Tunnel rollout.

Economic Reality

The finances reveal the stakes. With operating costs reportedly several times higher than daily toll income during early operation, the Karnaphuli Tunnel has become a recurring fiscal burden. Media reports show daily losses measured in lakhs of taka and cumulative shortfalls in the hundreds of millions in the tunnel’s first year of operation. That fiscal pressure raises questions about the prudence of financing megaprojects without robust contingency plans for lower than expected demand. The authorities have been forced to use state resources to fund operations while searching for measures to boost usage.

What could have been done differently?

There are clear lessons for future infrastructure development. First, aligning phased delivery of access roads, industrial land allotment and urban services with the opening of a flagship corridor improves the chances of meeting traffic targets. Second, demand modelling must include conservative scenarios and sensitivity analysis for slower economic absorption. Third, toll designs should consider introductory discounts, frequent user plans, and freight permits to seed traffic. Fourth, traffic impact assessments must be fully integrated into the transport master plan for Chattogram, so that the Karnaphuli Tunnel becomes a node in an orchestrated system rather than a single standalone asset. These are practical reforms that can improve outcomes for this and future projects.

Short Term Measures To Increase Usage

If policymakers want to increase traffic through the Karnaphuli Tunnel in the near term they can adopt several targeted interventions. Introduce temporary reduced tolls for commuters and commercial vehicles to encourage habit formation. Provide dedicated freight windows and permits so that long haul trucks can use the tunnel in off peak hours. Fast track completion of critical approach roads and junction improvements on both portals. Launch coordinated land release packages and incentives for industries willing to locate on the Anwara side. Improve public information campaigns and real-time travel data so drivers can see net benefits before switching routes. Each of these measures carries a cost but many are low cost relative to the tunnel’s capital value, and they can be tested and adjusted rapidly.

Medium Term Reforms

Medium term fixes require political will and institutional coordination. Integrate the Karnaphuli Tunnel into a Chattogram metropolitan transport plan that aligns public transport, freight corridors and land use zoning. Establish a traffic management authority with the mandate to redesign feeder roads and regulate heavy vehicle flows. Consider bundling the tunnel into a broader economic package that includes tax incentives, streamlined land titles and energy connections to speed industrial investments near the tunnel. In short the tunnel’s success will depend less on tunnel maintenance and more on broader governance and planning.

Longer Term Evaluation And Accountability

Given the scale of public funds and foreign loans deployed for the Karnaphuli Tunnel, transparency and regular evaluation should be priorities. Publish periodic independent traffic and revenue audits, compare results to the baseline scenarios in the feasibility study, and make adjustments to policy based on evidence. If projections prove persistently optimistic, reframe success metrics to include induced development, freight reliability and resilience benefits, not only daily vehicle counts and immediate toll break even. Such transparent reporting can preserve public trust and help refine project design for other national infrastructure investments.

Final Verdict

The Karnaphuli Tunnel is a high quality engineering achievement that has underperformed on the traffic and revenue front. Some of the causes lie in overoptimistic modelling, incomplete supporting infrastructure and delayed land development, while others reflect pricing and traffic management choices that discouraged early adoption. The tunnel remains an asset, but a lesson in how megaprojects need integrated delivery and staged activation to translate steel and concrete into reliable flows of people, goods and revenue.

With decisive short term pricing adjustments, accelerated feeder works, and medium term land use and institutional reforms, the Karnaphuli Tunnel’s promise can still be realised, albeit on a different timetable than originally advertised.

Action Checklist For Authorities

For clarity here are priority actions that can be implemented quickly.
Temporary toll reductions and frequent user passes to seed demand.
Fast completion of choke point junctions and approach roads.
Freight window policies to move trucks into off peak hours.
Land release and investment incentives near the southern portal.
Transparent publishing of monthly traffic and revenue numbers, with independent audits.

These actions require coordination between the Bridges Division, Chattogram city authorities, the port authority and the private sector, but they are technically feasible and could materially increase utilisation of the Karnaphuli Tunnel within months.

Closing Reflection, A City Building Lesson

Infrastructure transforms lives when it is planned as part of a system, not as a standalone monument. The Karnaphuli Tunnel shows the hazards of expecting single projects to catalyse complex socio economic changes overnight. The tunnel can yet become a success story if planners treat it as one node within a broader urban development strategy, align pricing and access policies with citizen behaviour, and pair the physical asset with the timely delivery of connecting investments, land policies and regulatory actions.